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The United States Supreme Court and the
Juvenile Courts-An Overview
Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.*
The Juvenile Court system was conceived and established at the turn
of the century, although belated to be sure. In 1899, the first juvenile
court in the United States was established in Cook County, Illinois, and
within a few years juvenile court laws had been passed in each of the
states. The whole philosophy was, and is, based on the concept that
youthful offenders should be treated differently than adults. Of course,
there are variations in the different statutes; in many states the juvenile
age is under 16; in a few it is 21; and in others such as Pennsylvania,
it is 18.1 Regardless of this detail however, the philosophy is the same,
and due to the flexibility and judicial discretion intentionally built
into the system, the potential for abuse is also the same. This problem
will be more fully developed in other articles in this symposium.
While the juvenile courts have existed for this long period, and on
the whole, functioned along traditional lines of judicial practice, one
aspect of the system has patently laggered. Perhaps because the young
offender is a "juvenile" for such a relatively short period of time;
perhaps because of the privacy of the proceedings; perhaps for other
unknown reasons, few appeals to state appellate courts were ever taken
in juvenile court cases, and indeed the United States Supreme Court
never considered a case involving juvenile court practice until 1966
when it decided Kent v. U.S.,2 considering a procedural point raised
under the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act.
KENT

As is true under most juvenile court statutes, the District of Columbia Juvenile Court had the discretion to waive its jurisdiction in a
case and certify the juvenile over to criminal court for trial as an adult.
The juvenile court did this to young Kent without a hearing, as was
0

Judge, Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsyl-

vania.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(2) (1939). Allegheny County has a separate Juvenile
Court Act found at PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 269-1 et seq. All references made hereinafter
are made to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act.
2. 383 US. 541 (1966).
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its practice. In reversing and remanding, the United States Supreme
Court, through Mr. Justice Fortas, held:
[There] is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults,
with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It
would be extraordinary if society's special concern for children,
as reflected in the District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. .. . [and] it does not. ... It is clear beyond

dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a "critically important"
action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile .... [A]s a condition to a valid waiver order, the juvenile was
entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social
records and probation or similar reports which presumably were
considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court decision. This "result" is required by the statute read
in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process
and the assistance of counsel.3
The case, of course, involved an interpretation of the Washington,
D.C. statute, and technically could be limited to that, but to the best
of this writer's knowledge all of the judges in Pennsylvania sitting in
juvenile court will not certify a case over to the adult side without a
"full" hearing. This has been construed by most as requiring the judge
to sit first as a committing magistrate; the Commonwealth must present
a prima facie case. Following this presentation, there is usually a motion
from the representative of the district attorney (if one is present) for
certification. The court then considers: the past delinquent history of
the juvenile; his maturity; the previous disposition by the court of
cases involving the juvenile; whether he is amenable to rehabilitation
under facilitites available to the juvenile court; whether he allegedly
was involved with adult co-defendants; and whether the interests of
justice would better be served by a jury trial-jury trials presently
4
being prohibited by the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act.

The question which has not been raised in any court as yet, as far as
I know, is this: After the prima facie case is presented, the motion for
certification made, and the testimony taken both in favor of and contra
to the motion, if the motion is refused, could counsel for the juvenile
claim that the judge who has heard all of the background and psycho3. Id. at 554, 556.
4.
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PA.

STAT. ANN.,

title 11, § 247 (1933).
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social history of the juvenile is no longer in a position to give a fair
and impartial hearing to the defense side of the case? After all, in the
usual case, the background information which is considered in a motion for certification is not known by the judge until an adjudication of
delinquency has been made.
GAULT

While the Kent case was a decision based on interpretation of the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court statute and could therefore be
construed as applying only to the District of Columbia, in 1967 the
United States Supreme Court made a far-reaching decision on the
constitutional rights of a juvenile in any juvenile court. This was the
landmark decision of In Re Gault.5 The majority, speaking through
Mr. Justice Fortas, generally held "the basic requirements of due process and fairness" entitle the juvenile to: 1.) adequate and timely
notice of the proceedings and charges against him; 2.) legal counsel
(including free legal counsel if the family cannot afford counsel); 3.)
the privilege against self-incrimination; 4.) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses.
While most Pennsylvania Juvenile Court judges have applied the
principles laid down in Gault to all juvenile cases, and likewise will
7
exclude or suppress statements obtained by police when the Miranda
warnings were not given, the opinion in Gault does not really go this
far. The court limited the application of these principles to the hearing
itself, not what went on before the hearing, and likewise limited its
opinion to those cases where an adjudication of delinquency may result
in commitment of the juvenile to an institution. The court emphasized
that it was not
. . . concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the prejudicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we
direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process .... We consider only the problems presented to us by this
case. These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is
made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be
committed to a state institution. As to these proceedings, there
5.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).

7.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

6. Id. at 12.
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appears to be little current dissent from the proposition that the
Due Process Clause has a role to play.8
The Supreme Court did not explain or anticipate how a judge is
supposed to know ahead of time whether or not he is going to commit
a juvenile before he has heard the psycho-social history of the juvenile
following the adjudication of delinquency. As a consequence, the prudent judge will apply those principles whether he feels the hearing will
result in a commitment or simply probation.
Neither did the court state whether the juvenile himself is competent
to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel or whether he must be joined in such a waiver by his parent or
parents. The court did acknowledge, however, that:
...special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some
differences in technique-but not in principle-depending upon
the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. 9
Though the Gault opinion limited itself to the adjudicatory phase
of the hearing and did not consider the prejudicial or post-adjudicative
process, it would be hard to imagine that the United States Supreme
Court will not extend the constitutional rights of a juvenile to events
occurring prior to the juvenile court hearing, and it has been so held
in Pennsylvania in a case involving a homicide.10 It should be noted,
however, that the fact that the defendant was a juvenile was apparently
not considered by the court, perhaps because the adult criminal court
in Pennsylvania has original jurisdiction in cases involving murder.1 1
Some courts have held that the parents must join in any waiver by
a juvenile of his constitutional rights, 12 while others have held that if
the juvenile is sufficiently mature and intelligent, he is capable of
making the waiver without the joinder of his parents. 13 It has been the
practice in Allegheny County to determine the question of a valid
waiver on a case-to-case basis, considering the factors of maturity, intelligence, and sophistication of the juvenile.
8. 387 U.S. at 13.
9. Id. at 55.
10. Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969).
11. PA. STAT. ANN., title 11, § 246 (1939).
12. See 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968); McClintock v. Indiana, 253 N.E.2d 233 (1969).
13. West v. U.S., 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969);
California v. Lara, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968);
Thornton v. Dennis M., 75 Cal. Rptr 1, 450 P.2d 296 (1969).
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*STANDARD

OF PROOF

In its most recent decision on the juvenile issue, the United States
Supreme Court, considering the standard of proof required for adjudication of a delinquent, held that the delinquent act must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 4 This case was appealed from the New
York Court of Appeals which had sustained the constitutionality of a
section of the New York Family Court Act which provided that a finding of delinquency could be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, protecting an accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, likewise applied to juveniles. Three justices, including Chief Justice Warren Burger, dissented. Again, as in
Gault, the Supreme Court seemed to make a point of recognizing a
distinction between a juvenile proceeding and an adult criminal proceeding.
We conclude, as we concluded regarding the essential due process
safeguards applied in Gault, that the observance of the standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "will not compel the States to
abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile
process."..

15
JURY TRIALs

The Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act specifically states that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials.1 6 The constitutionality of that
provision was recently upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
In Re Terry,17 and the North Carolina Supreme Court reached the
same result in In Re Burrus.'8 These two cases have been combined for
consideration by the United States Supreme Court this term. The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges has filed a brief as amicus
curiae urging affirmation of the Pennsylvania and North Carolina
Supreme Court decisions.
Writing for the majority in Terry, Mr. Justice Roberts made a
toughtful analysis of the opinions in Gault and Kent and concluded:
14. In Re Winship, 397 US. 358 (1970).
15. 397 U.S. at 367.
16. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 247 (1933).
17. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1969).
18. 275 N.C. 517, 169 So.2d 879 (1969).
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. .. Until such time as we are disabused of our belief that the potential for growth inherent in the juvenile system will not be ignored,
we hold that the juvenile courts in this Commonwealth, if conducted in accordance with the procedural safeguards set forth in
this opinion, are not constitutionally compelled to grant their
constituency the right to a trial by jury. 19
CONCLUSION

There are some who feel the Gault decision to be giant step backward in the juvenile court philosophy. 20 This writer does not share that
opinion. Oneneed only review the facts as related by Mr. Justice Fortas
in Gault to see the potential for abuse in a system originally designed
to help young people in trouble with the law. The United States Supreme Court cases which have been discussed above go far toward
clarifying procedure to be followed and providing guidelines for the
judiciary in handling Juvenile Court cases. One must wonder whether
the U.S. Supreme Court will stop short of holding that juveniles are
entitled to jury trials as a matter of right. This writer agrees with the
majority in Terry.
Other questions which will undoubtedly be coming up for decision
in this field are whether a juvenile has a right to bail and the rights of
parents and children in dependency and neglect hearings. It is the
opinion of this writer that the entire Juvenile Court system has been
made stronger as the result of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions.
19. 438 Pa. at 351, 265 A.2d at 356.
20. Garcia, The Fallacy of the Gault Case, 54 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 249 (1970).
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